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1. INTRODUCTION
I entered Harvard College in 1983. I wanted to major in math and
philosophy and to try out for the varsity swim team as a diver. As misfortune
would have it, I was hit by a van while riding my bicycle a few weeks before
school started. I was not severely injured-just a broken big toe-but it was
serious enough for me to sit out my freshman year. During my sophomore year,
months after my injury had healed, I tried out and made the team. I was a fair
athlete, coming in third or fourth place in a dual meet, but I would not call myself
a great or dedicated athlete. Our practices were Monday through Friday
afternoons for about three hours. We also practiced on Tuesday and Thursday
mornings for about 90 minutes starting at 6 or 7 AM. We were required to do
some weight training as well. On Saturday, we coached local children. We were
not paid, but any money we raised was put toward our annual winter training trip
to Hawaii. I never attended those training sessions because the trip coincided
with our winter break and it was one of the few times during the year that I could
visit my parents and my siblings. As I understand it, the money that I helped raise
went toward defraying trip-related costs for other swimmers and divers. On
Sunday, we rested.
During my junior year, I was injured in practice performing a very
simple dive: a front dive. I must have whiplashed my head as I entered the water,
resulting in a sprained neck and some twisted vertebrae. My coach immediately
sent me to the trainer, who was in a sports complex near Blodgett Pool. I recall
seeing an ice hockey player icing his legs. The trainer asked me to describe what
happened. After hearing my story, he put me in traction to stretch my neck and
then in a neck brace. At 5'2" and 105 pounds, the brace, which was made with a
male football player in mind, turned out to be much too large for me. So the
trainer cut the foam and cloth brace and referred me to a University Health
Services physical therapist who manipulated my spine and put me in traction
once a week for the remainder of the school year. I was in pain for nine months
before a chiropractor finally realigned my neck and back during the summer
break. I decided not to compete in my senior year.
In my capacity as a diver for the Harvard Varsity Swim Team, I never
thought of myself as an employee of Harvard, even when I was compelled to
[Vol. 119
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volunteer my precious Saturday mornings (that is, my sleep) as a diving coach. I
was proud to say that I was a student-athlete and proud to wear my crimson-
colored swim parka around campus. But I was also confused. After all, if I were
a student-athlete, why was I working out nearly 20 hours per week? I was also a
college work-study student; part of my financial aid package included working
for about 10 to 12 hours per week, sometimes more, and maintaining a B+
minimum average. I chose to work at Robbins Library of Philosophy so that I
could get a little schoolwork done when things were quiet. I also took about 12
hours of class. Not counting sleeping (56 hours), dining in hall (17 hours),
bathing (5 hours), walking to and from classes (5 hours), and walking to and
from practices (4 hours), I was already occupied nearly 45 hours per week.
Assuming no inefficiencies in going from one activity to another (a patently
inaccurate assumption), this left me about 38 hours per week or an average of
5.5 hours per day to study and socialize. Because most of that time went into
studying, I spent much of my dining time socializing with perhaps a few hours
off on the weekends to attend a college ball game or weekend evenings to attend
a dorm party or a movie. Of course, even those events were squeezed out during
the meet season.
My 18- to 20-year-old self found it hard to balance the demands of
college sport with the demands of college academics. I kept telling myself that
college is for education and sport is for fun. I went to Harvard for an education;
diving was a fun way to stay in shape. But the more we practiced, the less fun I
was having.
Thirty years have passed since I last competed for Harvard. In those three
decades, much has changed. Three changes are particularly relevant here. First,
the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") implemented
Proposition 48, approved in 1983 and implemented in 1986, which required
athletic recruits to earn an SAT score of 700 and a 2.0 GPA in 11 core high school
courses to be sports eligible.1 NCAA officials and others viewed this reform as
needed to remedy unintended consequences of the NCAA's 1970s reforms,
which had loosened academic standards for so-called student-athletes.
2 The
1970s changes resulted in significantly lower graduation rates for college athletes
and in several scandals involving students paid to take exams for these athletes.
3
The NCAA has since tinkered with academic standards, although they remain
See Michael Oriard, NCAA Academic Reform: History, Context and Challenges, 5 J.




3 Id. at 12-13.
2017]
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similar in kind to those of the 1980s.4 Second, the NCAA began drug testing its
athletes in 1986.5 Third, in the 1984 decision of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma,6 the Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA's control over
televised college football games constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.7 This decision resulted in TV revenue
sharing with universities, which in turn brought about more televised games,
generating dramatically increased revenue for big football schools and
significant realignment of conferences, with the best football programs (and
profits) concentrated in what is known as the Power Five football conferences.8
This Paper reviews one controversy that arose in the context of these
changes-the ever-increasing perception that college athletes, particularly
college football players at Power Five schools, are exploited and what we as a
society should do to protect these young men and women.
This Paper argues that exploitation of these students is possible, in part,
because the exploiters rely on the persistence of the student-athlete myth.
Accordingly, when football players at Northwestern University proposed a
solution-to allow some of these athletes to unionize so that they could bargain
for better "working" conditions and a cut of the profits created by increased
commercialization-that solution was met with disbelief and confusion. After
all, how can student-athletes, mere amateur athletes who are primarily seeking
an education, bargain for working conditions? That view temporarily won the
day in the Northwestern case.9
4 See generally Michael J. Mondello & Amy M. Abernethy, An Historical Overview of
Student-Athlete Academic Eligibility and the Future Implications ofCureton v. NCAA, 7 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 127 (2000).
5 See John A. Scanlan, Jr., Playing the Drug-Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory
Institutions, and the Structures of Constitutional Argument, 62 IND. L.J. 863, 882-84 (1986); see
also NCAA, DRUG TESTING PROGRAM 2016-2017,
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016SSIDrugTestingProgramBooklet 20160728.pdf
This change is important because it shows the significant pressure placed on athletes to become
increasingly better by using performance-enhancing drugs, even where the side effects of those
drugs might eventually have health-deleterious effects on the athlete. This Paper does not delve
into the significance of this relevant development.
6 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
8 Oriard, supra note 1, at 14-15.
9 See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 2015 WL 4882656, at *1 (Aug. 17, 2015)
(refusing to assert jurisdiction over the case and therefore unable to reach the question whether
scholarship football players are statutory employees under the National Labor Relations Act
entitled to form a union). But see OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, at 23 (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/general-
counsel-memos (follow "Report on the Statutory Rights of University" hyperlink) (determining
that "the application of the statutory definition of employee and the common-law test lead to the
conclusion that Division I FBS scholarship football players are employees under the NLRA, and
[Vol. 119
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To understand the nuances of this controversy, it is important to
understand its context-a context whose pieces, when put together, present a
case for structural exploitation. The pieces to this puzzle are collated in Parts II
to IV of this Paper. Part II briefly defines the concept of exploitation,
distinguishes between two types of exploitation (transactional and structural),
and posits that, while there may be some transactional exploitation in dealings
between college football players and their schools, this situation poses the
problems associated with structural exploitation.
Part III describes an important part of the sociological context in which
this story is unfolding; the current view that these young athletes are groomed
for exploitation as high school students and then further exploited as college
athletes. It briefly reviews six aspects of that exploitation: (1) the sport is brutal;
(2) there is a low financial payoff for a sport so high in health and safety risks;
(3) college football has been commercialized for some time with Power Five
universities and the NCAA having much at stake; (4) the student-athlete ideal is
a myth perpetuated by those who have a financial stake; (5) Power Five
universities hold monopsony power; and (6) thus far, lawmakers have been
unwilling to recognize this vulnerability, thereby exacerbating the exploitation.
Part IV positions this discussion in the context of two recent news
stories. First, the case of the Frostburg State football player who died in practice
because of a concussion that his coach allegedly ignored. Second, the
Northwestern case, in which the football players attempted to form a union. By
placing this controversy within the context of two specific cases, one which
represents the brutality of the sport and the other which represents players'
unsuccessful attempt at self-help, the reader should gain insights into the horrific
exploitation of our young people all in the name of commercialization.
Part V answers the question on which the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") punted'°-are Northwestern football players
employees for purposes of collective bargaining and mutual aid or protection (or
indeed for purposes of other labor statutes)? The answer is a resounding yes,
although that answer is not what is interesting about that question.
The final section, Part VI, discusses the problem of cognitive dissidence
between the legal answer-yes, college athletes often meet the definition of
employees-and our intuition that college athletes should not be employees of
the very university that allegedly has an interest in educating that young person.
that they therefore have the right to be protected from retaliation when they engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid and protection").
10 Anne Marie Lofaso, United States Labor Relations Board Cowardly Punts Its Duties,




Lofaso: Groomed for Exploitation! How Applying the Statutory Definition o
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
II. WHAT Is EXPLOITATION?
Exploitation is the key concept in understanding the student-athlete's
dilemma. It is not, however, a simple concept to deconstruct. This short section
gives a brief introduction to this concept, sufficient for the reader to understand
the issues at stake.
Thinkers writing in the socio-legal tradition have presented many
definitions of exploitation. This section starts with Karl Marx's thinking on the
subject because labor scholars build on, or draw inspiration from, his work even
when critical of it. Marx famously defined exploitation in the context of a
capitalist society as the taking of surplus value. Marx claims:
C=c+v
Here, capital (C) consists of the sum of the amount of money expended
on the means of production (c), a constant, and labor power (v), a variable that
is paid out as wages,11 where labor power is the "productive expenditure of
human brains, nerves, and muscles.1 2 According to Marx, the production
process produces a commodity, "an object outside us ... that by its properties
satisfies human wants."'13 The value of that commodity is c + v + s, where s
signifies surplus value14:
C' = c + v + s
In Marx's view, labor has transformed the original capital, C, into C'.
That surplus value, s, is purely the result of labor power.15 Marx coupled his labor
theory of value-labor and only labor creates value-with his labor theory of
surplus value-workers receive the value of their labor power typically in the
form of wages; the value of the commodity produced is greater than the value of
the wages earned; therefore, the worker receives less than he or she creates-to
show that workers are exploited by capitalists who are receiving the difference
between the commodity's value and the wages paid to their workers.16
Philosopher Gerry Cohen and others have partially discredited this
theory, showing that Marx's labor theory of surplus value is both unnecessary to
proving his moral claim that capitalism exploits workers and, in any event,
I1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 150 (Dave Allinson ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans.,
2015) (1887), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf,
see G. A. Cohen, The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
338, 341 (1979).
12 1 MARx, supra note 11, at 32.
13 Id. at 27.
14 Id. at 150.
15 Id. at 151.
16 See Cohen, supra note 11, at 342.
[Vol. 119
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false.17 According to Cohen, a theory of exploitation is not dependent on the
labor theory of surplus value because Marx's labor theory of surplus value can
be simplified into the following truism: "The capitalist receives some of the value
of the product."'8 The following chart shows Cohen's argument:
Comparing Marx's Argument that Capitalists Exploit Workers with the
Simplified Argument that Does Not Rel on the Labor Theory of Surplus'
9
Marx's Theory Simplification
Marx's Labor Theory of Value: Labor and labor alone creates value.
Labor and labor alone creates
value.
Marx's Labor Theory of Surplus Cohen's Truism: The capitalist
Value: receives some of the value of the
(a) The laborer receives the value product.
of his labor power.
(b) The value of the product is
greater than the value of his labor
power.
(c) Therefore, the laborer receives Therefore, the laborer receives less
less value than he creates. value than he creates, and
The capitalist receives the The capitalist receives some of the
remaining value, value the laborer creates.
Therefore, the laborer is exploited Therefore, the laborer is exploited by
by the capitalist, the capitalist.
Whether or not Cohen is correct, Marx's intuition, that capitalism
exploits, is significant.2" (Even Cohen agrees with this latter point.)2
Accordingly, several modem thinkers have worked to develop a theory, or at
least a definition, of exploitation within the work context. For example, political
theorist Alan Wertheimer defines exploitation as the morally wrongful use of a
person to gain advantage.22 Robert Goodin writes that exploitation is the flagrant
violation of the "special responsibilities to protect those who are particularly
vulnerable to our actions and choices.,23 Goodin further explains that
17 Id. But see Nancy Holstrom, Marx and Cohen on Exploitation and the Labor Theory of
Value, 26 INQUIRY 287 (1983) (arguing that Cohen is wrong and that Marx withstands his
criticisms). For a list of economists who have the same critique as Cohen, see id. at 287 n.3, 303.
18 Cohen, supra note 11, at 344.
19 This chart uses Cohen's language verbatim. See id. at 342-44.
20 See generally KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867).
21 Cohen, supra note 11, at 344.
22 See ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 10-12 (1996).
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[t]here are four [necessary] conditions.... First, the relationship
must be asymmetrical.... Second,.. . the subordinate party
must need the resource that the superordinate supplies....
Third,. . . the subordinate party must depend upon some
particular superordinate for the supply of needed
resources.... Fourth, the superordinate ... enjoys discretionary
control over the resources that the subordinate needs from him.24
Goodin's definition and his four-factored analysis focus on relationships with
power asymmetry, which might include parent-children, man-woman/majority-
minority, teacher-student, or employer-employee. There must also be a
vulnerability, which Goodin characterizes as a "needed resource[].'26 Here, the
needed resource is the opportunity to play college football. Under Goodin's
conditions, the University and the NCAA have duties to the college football
player, who is in a vulnerable relationship with both institutions.
For our purposes, the important insight comes in seeing a distinction
between transactional and structural exploitation. Transactional exploitation
focuses on the moral unfairness of particular transactions, whereas structural
exploitation focuses on institutions within a particular culture, which when taken
together enable exploitation.27 The main characteristics of transactional
exploitation are: (1) an interaction between the exploiter and the victim; (2) the
exploiter receives a benefit from the victim; (3) the exploiter advances his or her
self-interest or non-self-interested goal; and (4) harm to the victim relative to his
or her position without the transaction or the victim experiences the transaction
as degrading, humiliating, or unfair.28 The voluntariness of the transaction is not
a characteristic of transactional exploitation.29
Structural exploitation tends to occur in competitive markets due to "the
presence of dependent hird parties who are exploitable," including, for example,
employees.3 °
In the face of competitive pressure from rivals, an enterprise
takes unfair advantage of its dependents, gaining at their
expense. The exploiter does so to gain a competitive advantage
against rivals, or to level the playing field with rivals who also
exploit, or perhaps to avoid falling further behind in the struggle
24 Robert E. Goodin, Reasons for Welfare: Economic, Sociological, and Political-But
Ultimately Moral, in RESPONSIBILITY, RIGHTS, AND WELFARE 37 (Donald J. Moon ed., 1988).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Matt Zwolinski, Structural Exploitation, 29 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 154, 158-61 (2012).
28 Id. at 156.
29 Id.
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with rivals who have pulled ahead. In competitive settings where
structural exploitation occurs, the possibility of failure is real,
even for large and powerful enterprises. If they cannot compete,
they stand to suffer a sizable-even catastrophic-loss.31
In the context of college football, the exploiters would include NCAA
officials, university officials, and the coaches. Amidst intense competition,
coaches recruit the best high school players in the United States. These students
have no other choice if they wish to play professional football. Under National
Football League ("NFL") rules, they are not permitted to play professional ball
for at least the next three years.32 And there is no such thing as minor league
football. The Power Five universities together act as a monopsony.33 Within this
exploitative structure, universities may or may not act in a manner that is morally
reprehensible. For example, it may very well be that if a university used football-
player likenesses to profit from video games that they engaged in an exploitative
transaction. My concern here is not, however, with this type of exploitation, but
instead with the structures and institutions that create conditions ripe for
exploitation.
III. THE EXPLOITATION OF YOUNG ATHLETES:
A SNAPSHOT OF THE BRUTALITY AND COMMERCIALIZATION
OF HIGH SCHOOL AND COLLEGE FOOTBALL
This part focuses on two important structures that facilitate the
exploitation of youth football players in the United States. First, American
football is a dangerous sport that is not sufficiently regulated to protect the health
and safety of young American football players. American football players are
taking these health risks with nearly no prospect for long-term financial gain.
These points are developed in Section III.A. Second, the most elite college
football teams have significant financial stakes in the game. Rather than
admitting that, at the very least, their interest in educating these students and
protecting these athletes' conflicts, to some extent, with their business interests,
these universities and the NCAA perpetuate the myth of the amateur student-
athlete. This myth makes it structurally difficult for judges and lay people to view
these young athletes for what they are-professional football players.
Compounding this problem, college football is the only outlet for young men
who want to play professional ball because NFL rules prohibit young football
players from applying for a job as a professional football player until the third
year after their high school class graduates. These points are developed in Section
31 Id.
32 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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III.B. Part IV puts these points in the context of two stories. Finally, the law itself
facilitates this exploitation, first by failing to sufficiently regulate health and
safety, and second by refusing to look at the economic and social realities of
these student-athletes. Part V develops these final points.
A. American Football Player Side: A Dangerous Sport with Negligible
Prospects for Future Earnings
There is only one sport that regularly kills children. "That sport is
American football. 34
Winnsboro, Louisiana. September 2, 2015. Tyrell Cameron, a "humble"
16-year-old junior with "overwhelming potential," broke his neck during a punt
return in the fourth quarter.35 He never moved again.36 He died later that night.37
Bartlesville, Oklahoma. September 11, 2015. Ben Hamm, a 16-year-old
junior linebacker who served as both the captain and spiritual leader of his high
school football team, suffered a head injury during a tackle in the fourth quarter.38
He was taken by ambulance to a local hospital where doctors performed two head
surgeries and put him in a medically induced coma to relieve pressure on his
brain.39 He died eight days later from lack of oxygen to the brain.4"
Washington, New Jersey. September 25, 2015. Evan Murray, 17 years
old, gifted three-sport student-athlete, and starting quarterback for his high
school football team, "felt 'woozy"' after a tackle.41 Although he walked off the
field, he collapsed on the sidelines.42 He died later that night in the hospital due
to massive internal bleeding caused by a cut on his spleen.43
34 Charles P. Pierce, The Death of Evan Murray, GRANTLAND (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://grantland.com/the-triangle/the-death-of-evan-murray/. See generally Kaylyn Kahler & Dan
Greene, The Game's Tragic Toll, OPEN FIELD (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://mmqb.si.com/mmqb/2015/11/24/high-school-football-deaths-2015.
35 Police: Louisiana Prep Football Player Dies After Being Injured on Punt Return,




38 Wills Robinson, Talented Football Player at Private Christian High School Dies a Week





41 Pierce, supra note 34.
42 Id.
43 Id.; Patricia Didelot, Evan Murray Cause of Death: Coroner Reveals What Killed High
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Seattle, Washington. October 2, 2015. During the fourth quarter of
Evergreen High School's homecoming game, a 17-year-old football star, Kenny
Bui, took a hard hit and walked off the field dazed." A few moments later he
closed his eyes and never awakened.45 The straight-A student died a few days
later of traumatic brain injury.46
These are just 4 of 11 high school football-related deaths during the 2015
season. 47 According to the latest study, which reviewed data on high school and
college football fatalities between July 1990 and June 2010, "there were 243
football fatalities (1.0 per 100,000 participants), all in male athletes (average,
12.2 annually): 203 (average, 10.2 annually; 0.9 per 100,000 participants) in high
school players and 40 (average, 2.0 annually; 2.5 per 100,000 participants) in
college players.48
Notwithstanding these grim figures (or maybe because of them), football
remains the most popular participation sport for boys and young men in the
United States. Over one million American boys play high school football.49 Of
those, only 6.7%, nearly 73,000, play college football.50 The NFL drafts only 256
young men per year to become professional football players.5 1 That means that
only 1.6% of all college football players and only 0.023% of high school football
players ever succeed in becoming professional football players.2
For 16 years between 1988 and 2004, the NCAA Injury Surveillance
System ("ISS") collected injury and exposure data for nine men's sports:
baseball, basketball, fall and spring football, gymnastics, ice hockey, lacrosse,
soccer, and wrestling; and eight women's sports: basketball, field hockey,





47 See generally Kahler & Greene, supra note 34.
48 See Barry P. Boden et al., Fatalities in High School and College Football Players, 41 AM.
J. SPORTS MED. 1108, 1109 (2013).
49 Football, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/football (last updated Mar.
10, 2017).
50 Id.; see Estimated Probability of Competing in College Athletics, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-college-athletics
(last updated Mar. 10, 2017).
51 Football, supra note 49; see Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics,
NCAA http ://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-
professional-athletics (last updated Mar. 10, 2017).
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gymnastics, ice hockey, lacrosse, soccer, softball, and volleyball.53 Not
surprisingly, this study showed that, although all of these sports contained some
risks, football had the highest injury rates for both practices (9.6 injuries per 1000
A-Es [athlete exposures]) and games (35.9 injuries per 1000 A-Es).54
Another significant feature of football is the high association of
concussions with the game and the correlation between multiple concussions and
later health problems. A concussion is simply the rapid movement of the brain
hitting up against the skull, typically resulting from a blow to the head.55 High-
school age and even young-adult athletes are more vulnerable to the neurological
effects of concussions than are adult players, in part because their brains are not
fully developed until they are 25 years old.56 According to the Sports Concussion
Institute:
Recent research demonstrates that high school athletes not only
take longer to recover after a concussion when compared to
collegiate or professional athletes, but they also may experience
greater severity of symptoms and more neurological
disturbances as measured by neuropsychological and postural
stability tests. It is also estimated that 53% of high school
athletes have sustained a concussion before participation in high
school sports, and 36% of collegiate athletes have a history of
multiple concussions. Because the frontal lobes of the human
brain continue to develop until age 25, it is vital to manage youth
concussions very conservatively to ensure optimal neurological
development and outcomes.57
Concussions are commonplace in football with compounding effects.
According to research reported by the Sports Concussion Institute, those who
have received one concussion are "[one to two] times more likely to receive a
second one.",58 After two concussions, "a third is two to four times more likely,
and after three concussions, a fourth is three to nine times more likely. '59 A
53 J.M. Hootman et al., Epidemiology of Collegiate Injuries for 15 Sports: Summary and
Recommendations for Injury Prevention Initiatives, 42 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 311, 318 (2007).
Although data was collected for these 17 sports, information on men's gymnastics was not reported
because of the small sample size. Moreover, data on women's ice hockey was collected starting in
2000, after the study had commenced.
54 Id. at 311. A-E stands for athlete exposure and "was defined as 1 athlete participating in 1
practice or game and is expressed as an athlete-exposure (A-E)." Id.
55 Concussion Facts, SPORTS CONCUSSION INST.,
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medical history of multiple concussions can result in the development of mild
cognitive impairments, chronic traumatic encephalopathy, and post-concussion
syndrome, among other things.6' A better understanding of chronic traumatic
encephalopathy, "a progressive degenerative disease of the brain found in
athletes (and others) with a history of repetitive brain trauma, including
symptomatic concussions as well as asymptomatic subconcussive hits to the
head," has in particular bolstered the view that the long term effects of multiple
concussions is devastating for the athlete's long-term health.
61
B. College Football's Business Side: The Arms Race
The NCAA represents itself as the protector of amateur sports
competition and the guardian of the student-athlete.
62 The NCAA considers
amateur competition to be "a bedrock principle of college athletics" and "crucial
to preserving an academic environment in which acquiring a quality education is
the first priority." 63 To highlight the primacy of academics over athletics, the
NCAA further explains that "[i]n the collegiate model of sports, the young men
and women competing on the field or court are students 
first, athletes second.
64
History belies these representations, showing instead that football's
commercialization is a systemic problem in search of transformative solutions.
The commercialization of college football is rooted in the hallowed halls of Yale
60 Id.
61 According to the Boston University CTE Center:
[R]ecent reports have been published of neuropathologically confirmed CTE
in retired professional football players and other athletes who have a history of
repetitive brain trauma. This trauma triggers progressive degeneration of the
brain tissue, including the build-up of an abnormal protein called tau. These
changes in the brain can begin months, years, or even decades after the last
brain trauma or end of active athletic involvement. The brain degeneration is
associated with memory loss, confusion, impaired judgment, impulse control
problems, aggression, depression, and, eventually, progressive dementia.
What is CTE?, BU CTE CENTER, http://www.bu.edu/cte/about/what-is-cte/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2017). See generally Julian E. Bailes et al., Role of Subconcussion in Repetitive Mild Traumatic
Brain Injury: A Review, 119 J. NEUROSURGERY 1235-45 (Nov. 2013). See also Bennet I. Omalu et
al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) in a National Football League Player: Case Report
and Emerging Medicolegal Practice Questions, 6 J. FORENSIC NURSING 40-46 (2010); Bennet I.
Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football League Player: Part II,
59 NEUROSURGERY 1086-93 (Nov. 2006), http://www.protectthebrain.org/documents/CTE-Part-
II-Neurosurgery-2006.pdf; Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a
National Football League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 128-34 (July 2005),
http://m.protectthebrain.org/documents/CTE-Part-I-Neurosurgery.pdf.
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University.65 A star athlete at Yale during the late nineteenth century could
expect the following:
(1) a suite of rooms in the dorm; (2) free meals at the University
club; (3) a one-hundred-dollar scholarship; (4) the profits from
the sale of programs; (5) an agency arrangement with the
American Tobacco Company, under which he received a
commission on cigarettes sold in New Haven; and (6) a ten-day
paid vacation to Cuba.66
According to one uncontroversial study, sociologists traced college
football's commercialization and functional rationalization to Yale's nouveau
riche industrial ruling class, which gained control of Yale's governing board and
injected into football's organizational structure principles of industrialization,
such as functional specialization, which permeate the college football business
model to this day.67 For example, Yale coaches specialized, coordinated training,
and strategized through daily meetings.68 Yale coaches also collected and
maintained accurate data and reviewed those data in creating game strategies.69
Harvard, by contrast, engaged in none of these modem techniques devised by
Yale.70 As a result, between 1875 and 1907, Yale defeated Harvard in all but
three games, made more money than Harvard (sometimes by a factor of two to
one), and produced three times as many professional football coaches.71
By 1905, numerous universities either banned or considered banning the
sport because of its brutality and commercialization.72 Columbia, the largest
university at that time, together with several other colleges, banned the sport,
while Harvard, the second largest university, nearly banned the sport.73 The crisis
began in Columbia in 1899 when the football manager paid scholarships to five
student players out of university funds.74 The following year, the team defaulted
on a contract to rent a playing field, which led university officials to threaten to
65 David L. Wesby & Allan Sack, The Commercialization and Functional Rationalization of
College Football, 47 J. HIGHER EDUC. 625 (1976).
66 Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Role in
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 9, 11 n.7 (2000).
67 Wesby & Sack, supra note 65, at 632-42.
68 Id. at 628.
69 Id. at 628-29.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 628-32.
72 Ronald A. Smith, Harvard and Columbia and a Reconsideration of the 1905-06 Football
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ban the sport unless it could sustain itself.75 The 1905-1906 controversy
ultimately resulted in the creation of the NCAA.76
These two critiques of the game have persisted to this day: the sport is
excessively violent and although it represents itself as an "'educational
enterprise' . . . [its] thoroughgoing commercialization [is] inconsistent with
received academic values.,77 The violence is not limited to on-the-field fatalities
and life-threatening or life-shortening injuries, but also includes a culture that
seems to encourage violence. One sports news blog recently reported on the top
12 NFL player gun-related deaths since 2006.78 One recent economic study
reported a strong link between football and rape.79 The study, which reviewed
rape reports of campus and local law enforcement agencies associated with
Division IA schools, detailed that incidents of reported rapes spiked 41% on
home-game days, 15% on away-game days, and 57% on days of an underdog
home-team upset.80 The study hypothesizes that these rapes are likely caused by
increased alcohol consumption, which fosters aggression resulting in an
additional 253 to 770 additional rapes at these college campuses 
per year.81
Another website maintains a list and description of legal cases involving sexual
assaults by college football players, which goes back to the 1970s.
82
The business side of college football recounts a mixed tale of ever-
increasing revenues and expenditures with big winners, such as Texas, and many




78 Vinnie Iyer, Guns and the NFL: Players Shot Since 2006, SPORTING NEWS (June 6, 2016),
http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/list/nfl-players-shot-guns-aqib-talib-wil-smith-sean-taylor-
plaxico-burress/mltyh8vnrk8al 5eja7ku6xaf0.
79 Danielle Paquette, The Disturbing Truth About College Football and Rape, WASH. POST
(Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2 015/12/29/the-disturbing-
truth-about-college-football-and-rape/?utm_term=.ae
6 63 93 55362 (reporting on a study conducted
by Texas A&M professor of economics, Jason Lindo, and published in December 2015).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Jessica W. Luther, A List of College Football Sexual Assault Investigations and Cases,
JESSICA W. LUTHER BLOG (Oct. 30, 2016), http://jessicawluther.com/thelist/.
83 Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Playing in the Red, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/
2015/11/23/running-up-the-bills/. See generally
David C. Hardesty, Jr., The Value and Perils of Intercollegiate Athletics: A Presidential
Perspective, in LEADING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND COMMENTARY 199-207
(2007), reprinted in REVERSING FIELD: EXAMINING COMMERCIALIZATION, LABOR, GENDER, AND
RACE IN 21 ST-CENTURY SPORTS LAW 28-33 (andr& douglas pond cummings & Anne Marie Lofaso
eds., 2010) (hereinafter REVERSING FIELD).
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arms race,84 starts with the 128 members of the NCAA Division I Football Bowl
Subdivision ("FBS"), the highest level of collegiate football. Based on a survey
of 48 of those 128 teams,85 The Washington Post reported that 25 or 51.9% were
running a deficit in 2014. 86 The Washington Post further reported that, between
2004 and 2014, "the combined income of... 48 [surveyed FBS] departments
nearly doubled, from $2.67 billion to $4.49 billion., 87 Indeed, according to the
NCAA, only 24 FBS schools generated a profit in 2014.88 "Athletic directors at
money-losing departments defend their spending as essential to keeping pace
with competition. Their programs benefit universities in ways that don't show on
athletics financial statements, they said, like media exposure that can cause
increased applicants and help fundraising."89
University revenue is just part of the story. In 2015, a district court judge
approved a $60 million settlement in a lawsuit against the NCAA, the Collegiate
Licensing Company, and video-game manufacturer, Electronic Arts, for using
the images, likenesses, and names of more than 20,000 current and former
college football players in video games to generate profits.90 The players initially
received no money because NCAA rules forbid student-athletes from receiving
pay for play.9
84 For an in-depth analysis of the college sports arms race, see Alfred Dennis Mathewson,
Exploring the Commericialized Arms Race Metaphor, in REVERSING FIELD, supra note 83, at 34-
45.
85 All of the teams examined belonged to the Power Five, the NCAA Division I FBS's
wealthiest five conferences, which is comprised of 65 teams. Id. Those conference are: ACC (15
teams, 14 teams plus independent eam Notre Dame), Big 12 (10 teams), Big 10 (14 teams), Pac
12 (12 teams), and SEC (14 teams). See NCAA College Football, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
http://collegefootball.ap.org/conferences (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
86 Hobson & Rich, supra note 83. This figure is down from 60.4% in 2004 (based on a survey
of 48 teams). Id.
87 Id.
88 Brian Bumsed, Athletic Departments that Make More Than They Spend Still a Minority,
NCAA (Sept. 18, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/athletics-departments-make-more-they-spend-still-minority; see DANIEL L. FULKS,
REVENUES AND EXPENSES 2004-2014: NCAA DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS
REPORT 8, 13 (2015),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015%2ODivision%201%20RE%20report.pdf.
89 Hobson & Rich, supra note 83. For the NCAA's perspective on this question, see Bernard
Franklin, More Lightning and Less Thunder, in REVERSING FIELD, supra note 83, at 16-27.
90 Jon Solomon, Judge Approves NCAA Video Game Settlements to Pay Players, CBS SPORTS
(July 16, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/judge-approves-ncaa-video-
game-settlements-to-pay-players/.
91 Jim Kleinpeter, College Football Players Used in EA's NCAA Video Games to Get About
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It is noteworthy that college football serves as the American football
minor league. This is enabled most prominently by the NFL new player
eligibility rule, which prohibits a team from:
[S]ign[ing] a player to an NFL Player Contract ... or select[ing]
a player in a Draft ... until such player meets one of the
following requirements:
COLLEGE ELIGIBILITY. All college football eligibility of
such player has expired through participation in college football
(expiration does not include a loss of college football eligibility
through withdrawal from school, dismissal, or signing of a
professional contract in another football league). Or,
GRADUATION. Such player has graduated and received a
diploma from a recognized college or university prior to the
beginning of the... League's next regular season .... Or,...
FIVE-YEAR RULE. Five League seasons have elapsed since
such player first entered, attended, practiced football at, or
participated in football games for a recognized junior college,
college, or university .... Special consideration is granted to
those players whose college and/or conference allow five years
of football eligibility, during all of which a player may
participate full-time, as distinguished from those who "red-
shirt," i.e., do not participate during one particular year. If a
player under such circumstances has completed four years of
participating football eligibility and elects not to avail himself
of the fifth year, such player is eligible for selection in the
League. Or,
NON-FOOTBALL COLLEGIANS. Such player did not play or
otherwise participate in college football, and four League
seasons have elapsed since the player first entered or attended
college. Or,
PLAYER NOT ATTENDING COLLEGE. Any player who
does not attend college is automatically eligible for selection in
the next principal Draft that is conducted after four NFL regular
seasons have begun and ended following either his graduation
from high school or graduation of the class with which he
entered high school, whichever is earlier. If four football seasons
have not elapsed, he is ineligible for selection, but may apply to
the Commissioner for Special Eligibility .... Or,
SPECIAL ELIGIBILITY. Such player has been granted
eligibility through special permission of the
Commissioner ....
92 Eligibility Rules, NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
https://www.nflregionalcombines.com/Docs/Eligibility%20Rules.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
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These rules essentially prevent young football players from entering the
professional football market for at least three years after high school-or when
they are at least 21 years old. For purposes of structural exploitation, the motive
behind this rule is irrelevant. It may very well be that young athletes are not
permitted to play professional ball for several years because their bodies are not
physically able to play with those mature men who play professional ball. These
eligibility rules nevertheless set up a market with the Power Five universities
wielding monopsony power over the student-athletes.
IV. Two CATALYST CASES: FROSTBURG STATE AND NORTHWESTERN
There are many ways to legally protect workers from their employers'
arbitrary rules, but two of the most common means are regulation and bargaining.
The wrongful-death suit of former Frostburg State football player Derek Sheely
presents the case for regulation; Northwestern football players' attempt to
organize presents the case for bargaining.
In August 2011, 22-year-old Derek Sheely was a fullback for Frostburg
State's football team.93 During practice, Derek suffered yet another concussion94
while performing a variation of the "Oklahoma drill"-two players running full
force at each other until one ends up on the ground and the other ends up
victorious.95 Think jousting.96 According to news reports, "it was the fourth time
in three days that a wound on Sheely's head had re-opened."97 Sheely also
reportedly told his coach that he had a headache.98 The coach allegedly
responded: "'Stop your bitching and moaning, and quit acting like a pussy and
get back out there, Sheely!' Sheely collapsed a few minutes later, and died within
the week."99
93 Maryclaire Dale, NCAA Among Defendants in Concussion-Related Lawsuit, USATODAY
(Aug. 27, 2013, 11:36 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/O8/27/frostburg-
state-derek-sheely-ncaa-concussion-lawsuit/2706347/.
94 Id.
95 David Fleming, Is the Oklahoma Drill Just a Rite of Passage or Everything to Fear About
Football?, ESPN (Aug. 19, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story//id/13348894/is-
oklahoma-drill-just-rite-passage-everything-fear-football.
96 Id.
97 Dan Diamond, A Head Injury in Practice Killed Derek Sheely. Is the NCAA to Blame?,
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The family sued the NCAA, the helmet manufacturer, and Frostburg
State coaches for wrongful death.100 The news reported that, according to court
papers, although the NCAA "admits that it was 'founded to protect young people
from the dangerous and exploitative athletic practices of the time,"' it "denies
that it has a legal duty to protect student-athletes."
101
Sheely's wrongful death lawsuit presents a classic case in the tort versus
regulation debate. A wrongful death suit is a suit in tort. Tort law serves many
purposes-(l) moral justice,10 2 (2) social welfare, (3) compensation, (4)
deterrence, and (5) civil peace. In particular, tort law (1) condemns the conduct
of the tortfeasor; (2) spreads risk onto those who are best able to bear that risk;
(3) compensates victims for the harm they have suffered at the hands of the
tortfeasor's intentional or negligent conduct; (4) reduces accidents by providing
disincentives for unsafe conduct; and (5) eliminates the likelihood of self-help or
revenge.1 3 In the United States, these goals play out in a liberal democracy and
capitalist economy, whose citizen-actors value personal autonomy and a free
market that promotes economic growth. Accordingly, tort law will also tend to
favor rules that promote individual liberty and serve (or at least do not undercut)
capitalist goals.
Statutes and regulations can share the same goals as the common law of
tort. The question thus becomes, when should policy makers step in to ensure
which of these goals are served, who should bear the burden of serving those
goals, and whether statutory/regulatory law should preempt or complement tort
law? Yale Law Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that
[i]deally, tort law and regulatory standards work together to
further deterrence and compensation goals. Torts and
regulations can be complementary: 1) when tort doctrines are
stopgaps which apply absent more stringent statutes; 2) when
regulatory standards are intended as minima which more
stringent tort doctrines can supplement, and 3) when a
regulatory standard is set at the socially optimal level and tort
100 Mike Singer, NCAA "Denies Legal Duty" to Protect Student-Athletes, Court Filing Says,
CBS SPORTS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/general/news/ncaa-denies-legal-duty-to-
protect-student-athletes-court-filing-says/.
101 Id.
102 See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 184, 186 (1987) (explaining that tort "[iliability redressed the moral disequilibrium caused
by the defendant").
103 See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69 (1975).
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doctrine imposes either strict liability or a standard of care lower
than that required by the agency."°4
With respect to the health and safety of student-athletes, Rose-Ackerman's first
circumstance is true: regulation is absent. Accordingly, courts should "see tort
law as a stopgap pending future statutory regulation" and "'[t]he common law
standard of [reasonableness]... can at least serve the needs of our society until
the legislature imposes higher standards.""015 Rose-Ackerman adds that once "a
regulatory statute is then passed, courts should resolve conflicts between tort
doctrines and regulatory principles by according priority to the statute." 106
Northwestern University is a private, non-profit teaching institution,
which has a Division IA football team in the Big Ten Conference, one of the
Power Five conferences.'0 7 That team has 112 players, 85 of whom receive
$61,000 annual scholarships. 108 The NCAA allows both annual and multi-year
scholarships. 109 Northwestern utilizes four- to five-year scholarships. 10 These
scholarship players must live on campus for two years and receive a meal plan."'1
After two years, scholarship athletes may live off campus and receive a monthly
stipend of $1200-1600 to cover expenses."2 No taxes are withheld from
scholarships.13 The NCAA does not allow additional compensation."14
Northwestern football players devote an enormous amount of their time
"playing" football. In particular, players devote 40 to 50 hours per week in
football-related activities during the season and in pre-season play.115 That
commitment reduces to 12 to 25 hours per week in the post-season.16 The
players' daily schedule is tightly constrained and divided into four groups:
meetings, practices, film sessions, and drills. 117
104 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 54, 55
(1991).
105 See id. (quoting Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968)).
106 See id. (citing Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir. 1989)).
107 Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 2015 WL 4882656, at *2 (Aug. 17, 2015).
108 Id.
109 Id. at *9; see also Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA: Scholarships, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa (l st visited Mar. 22, 2017).





115 Id. at *12.
116 Id. at *21 n.33.
117 Id. at *11-12.
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Northwestern football players spend less time in academic-related
activities. As students, they attend up to 20 hours in class per week.118 The
athletic department provides tutors and study-group programs.1 19 The department
also strongly discourages conflicts with football, thereby suggesting that the
football schedule takes priority over course selection. 120 Ninety-seven percent of
all Northwestern football players graduate. 
121
Northwestern University, a private, non-profit teaching institution, is an
employer under National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") section 2(2).122 In
2014, Northwestern football players, represented by College Athletic Players
Association ("CAPA"), filed a petition for election to determine whether those
football players would like to be represented by a union.12 3 CAPA claimed that
the players simply wanted a voice at the table.
Section 158(d) defines the obligation to bargain collectively as:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
124concession ....
This section reveals that employers and unions must bargain "in good
faith ... [over] wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
125
Although unionization typically starts with a particular grievance, here the
players had a set of grievances, which could be resolved through bargaining.
Players have no control over their schedules, their break times, or their meals. 
126
Indeed, players have little control even over their limited free time.127 These are
118 Id. at *16.
119 Id. at *17-18.
120 Id. at *17.
121 Id. at *18.
122 Id. at *3 n.5.
123 Eben Novy-Williams & Scott Soshnick, Northwestern University Football Players Seek to
Form Union, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2014, 5:25
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 14-01 -28/northwestern-university-football-
players-seeking-to-form-union.
124 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
125 Id.
126 Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. at * 11.
127 Id. at *11-15.
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precisely the types of issues-terms and conditions of the job--that are suited
for collective bargaining. Even wages (in the form of scholarship or other types
of income) could be negotiated, although such negotiations would have to occur
within the context of NCAA rules. To the extent that NCAA rules conflict with
the players' right to bargain over wages and other income, it is possible that the
Board could decide, with court approval, that those regulations are preempted by
the NLRA.
V. WHO'S AN EMPLOYEE?
A. U.S. Law Provides Three Primary Definitions of Employee
In the United States, workers are entitled to rights and protections only
if they qualify as employees under a statute or the common law.128 For example,
only those private-sector workers who qualify as a statutory employee under the
NLRA 129 or the Railway Labor Act 130 possess free-association rights such as the
rights to engage in collective bargaining and concerted activities; public-sector
workers must meet those definitions under the Federal Service Labor-
Management Relations Statute,131 or a similar state statute.1 32 In most cases, the
term employee is defined in accordance with the purposes of the statute. The
NLRA is a significant exception to this rule.
1. The Common-Law Test Emphasizes Control
Most laws for determining whether a worker is an employee for purposes
of that law fall into one of three legal tests: the common-law test, the economic-
realities test, or the hybrid test.133 The common-law test derives from England's
128 Defining the statutory term employee is significant because those labor rights belong "only
to those workers who qualify as 'employees' as that term is defined in the Act." NLRB v. Town &
Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 89 (1995); see Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union
Repression in an Era of Recognition, 62 ME. L. R.Ev. 199 (2010).
129 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-59 (2012). See generally Ellen Dannin, Not a Limited, Confined, or
Private Matter-Who Is an "Employee" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 59 LAB. L.J. 5,
5 (2008); Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Employee: Putting the Autonomous Dignified Union
Worker Back to Work, 5 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 495 (2010) [hereinafter The Vanishing Employee].
130 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-65 (2012).
131 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-106, 7111-123, 7131-135 (2012).
132 See SETH D. HARRIS, JOSEPH E. SLATER, ANNE MARIE LOFASO & CHARLOTTE GARDEN,
MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2016);
PAUL M. SECUNDA, ANNE MARIE LOFASO, JOSEPH E. SLATER & JEFFERY M. HIRSCH, MASTERING
LABOR LAW (2014).
133 For an excellent summary of these tests, see generally KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT &
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master-servant law. 134 In the United States, the common-law test, codified in the
Restatement of Agency, divides workers into servants and independent
contractors.1 35 "A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs
of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of
the services is subject to the other's control or right to control."136 By contrast, at
the time that Congress originally enacted the NLRA (Wagner Act) 137 and the
Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, "[a]n independent contractor is a person who
contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the
other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking."138 After Taft-Hartley's
enactment, the American Law Institute redrafted the Restatement with results
published in 1958, explaining that the following factors are to be considered in
determining whether one is a servant or an independent contractor:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of
the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
1 39
134 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422-32 (1765).
135 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
136 See id. § 220(1). The original restatement test had slightly different wording. See
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1933) ("A servant is a person employed
by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the
service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.").
137 29 U.S.C. § 151-69 (1935).
138 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1933).
139 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
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The Department of Labor ("DOL") has published a guide for
understanding how these factors are balanced.40 While the DOL's guide is not
binding on courts or government agencies interpreting the law de novo, the guide
helps us to understand the meaning of these factors, which is not always easily
intuited. According to the DOL paper, the common-law test is used to determine
whether a person is an employee for purposes of several statutes including the
NLRA, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), federal tax
laws, and some insurance laws.
141
140 Charles J. Muhl, What Is an Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law,
MONTHLY LAB. REv. (Jan. 2002), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/artlfull.pdf.
141 Id. at 3, 6.
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Factors Used to Determine a Worker's Status Under the Common-Law Test
142
Factor Worker is an employee Worker is an independent
if contractor if.,
Right to Control Employer controls Worker controls details of the
details of the work work
Type of Business Worker is not engaged Worker operates in business
in business or distinct from employer's
occupation distinct from business
employer's
Supervision Employer supervises Work is done without
worker supervision
Skill Level Skill level need not be Skill level is specialized, is
high or unique unique, or requires substantial
training
Tools and Employer provides Worker provides
Materials instrumentalities, tools, instrumentalities and tools of
and location of workplace and works at a site
workplace other than the employer's
Continuing Worker is employed for Worker is employed for
Relationship extended continuous special project or for limited
period time
Method of Worker is paid by the Worker is paid by the project
Payment hour, or other
computation based on
time worked is used to
determine pay
Integration Worker is part of Work is not part of
employer's regular employer's regular business
business
Intent Employer and worker Employer and worker do not
intend to create an intend to create an employer-
employer-employee employee relationship
relationship
Employment by Worker provides Worker provides services to
more than one services only to one more than one business
firm employer
The main problem with the test is that it is under-inclusive; a worker
could be dependent on an employer for that worker's livelihood yet have no
employment protection. There should be no wonder that this problem developed.
After all, the common-law test was developed to ensure that employers were not
unfairly held liable for the torts of their contractors under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. Such was the case in the famous British legal controversy
142 Id. at 7.
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of Rylands v. Fletcher.143 There, John Rylands, a businessman who paid an
engineer and contractor to design and build a water reservoir on his land, was
ultimately held liable for the negligence of those contractors who (unbeknownst
to Rylands) chose not properly to block old coal shafts discovered adjacent to
Rylands's mine. 144 As a result, the first time Rylands's reservoir was filled it
burst and flooded Thomas Fletcher's mine causing considerable damage. 145 As
Harvard Law School Dean Ezra Thayer wrote:
The territory within which the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher
may operate is thus bounded on one side by that in which the
defendant is excused by the intervention of some new agency
which could not be foreseen, and, on the other, by that in which,
even if Rylands v. Fletcher were altogether repudiated, the
defendant would be held by the ordinary principles of
negligence. Between these limits is left only the field where the
thing which the defendant has collected escapes by its own force
acting on existing conditions without negligence of the
defendant. Such an intermediate ground no doubt exists; but it
is a little space.146
By contrast, the Supreme Court, in rejecting application of the common-
law test to the Wagner Act, wrote:
The mischief at which the Act is aimed and the remedies it offers
are not confined exclusively to "employees" within the
traditional legal distinctions separating them from "independent
contractors." Myriad forms of service relationship [sic], with
infinite and subtle variations... blanket the nation's
economy.... Unless the common-law tests are to be imported
and made exclusively controlling, without regard to the statute's
purposes, it cannot be irrelevant that the particular workers in
these cases are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils
the statute was designed to eradicate and that the remedies it
affords are appropriate for preventing them or curing their
harmful effects in the special situation.
147
143 [1868] HL 330 (Eng.).
144 Id. at 337-42.
145 Id. at 331-32.
146 Ezra Ripley Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARv. L. REv. 801, 804-05 (1916). This
article was published posthumously.
147 NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126-27 (1944).
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A good example of the borderline case is the newsboy.48 The Supreme
Court captures their vulnerability in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.:
The newsboys work under varying terms and conditions. They
may be "bootjackers," selling to the general public at places
other than established comers, or they may sell at fixed "spots."
They may sell only casually or part-time, or full-time; and they
may be employed regularly and continuously or only
temporarily. The units which the Board determined to be
appropriate are composed of those who sell full-time at
established spots. Those vendors, misnamed boys, are generally
mature men, dependent upon the proceeds of their sales for their
sustenance, and frequently supporters offamilies. Working thus
as news vendors on a regular basis often for a number ofyears,
they form a stable group with relatively little turnover, in
contrast to schoolboys and others who sell as bootiackers,
temporary and casual distributors. 
149
The Court concluded that when such workers are characterized by qualities such
as "inequality of bargaining power," have the capacity to "interrupt[]...
commerce through strikes and unrest," and would benefit from collective
bargaining, the "appropriate test for coverage" may be something more akin to
an economic-realities test:
[W]hen the particular situation of employment combines these
characteristics, so that the economic facts of the relation make it
more nearly one of employment than of independent business
enterprise with respect to the end sought to be accomplished by
the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical
legal classification for purposes unrelated to the statute's
objectives and bring the relation within its protections.1
50
In his seminal article, Professor Harry Arthurs popularized the term dependent
contractor, coined by a Swedish scholar writing in English.151 By that term,
Professor Arthurs meant "legally independent but economically dependent
148 This may not actually be a close case, especially because the Board threw out the bootjackers
(workers who sold extras occasionally). Id. at 132. Inclusion of the bookjackers would have made
this a closer case. This Paper uses the example here because the Supreme Court characterized it as
a close case and because it is the case that the provoked Congress to create the independent-
contractor exemption.
149 See id. at 115-16 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added).
151 See H. W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of
Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 89 n.1 (1965) (citing SCHMIDT, THE LAW OF
LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (1962)).
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contractors.152 Simply put, a test devised primarily for determining whether an
employer has sufficient control over his agent for the law to impose liability for
the agent's action is not well suited for determining whether a worker is
sufficiently dependent on his employer for his livelihood to determine whether
that employee would benefit from collective bargaining. This is where the
economic-realities test comes into play.
2. The Economic-Realities Test Emphasizes the Worker's Economic
Dependency on the Employer
The DOL uses the economic-realities test primarily to determine
whether a person is an employee for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"); that is, to determine whether an employer should be subject to
providing its workers with minimum wage and overtime protection.'53 That
statute defines employee as "any individual who is employed by an employer,"
' 1 4
where "[e]mploy includes to suffer or permit to work., 155 The Supreme Court
fleshed out this vague definition in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,156 noting
the purpose of the FLSA-"to lessen ... the distribution in commerce of goods
produced under subnormal labor conditions."157 There, the Court easily
concluded that meat boners who worked for a slaughterhouse were employees
for FLSA purposes even though they owned the tools of their trade and were paid
collectively by the amount of meat boned.158 The Court examined the workers'
economic dependence on the employer rather than the formality of their work
agreement.159 As the current DOL guide states, under this test, an "employment
relationship exists if [the] individual is economically dependent on a business for
continued employment."'1 60 In that vein, the Court agreed with the lower court
that these workers were employees entitled to the wage and hour protections of
the FLSA because they worked alongside undisputed employees toward a
common purpose, the production of boneless beef.
161
152 See id. at 109-10.
153 See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
154 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2012).
155 See id. § 203(g).
156 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
157 Id. at 727.
158 Id. at 730.
159 Id.
160 Muhl, supra note 140, at 6 exhibit 1.
161 Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 726.
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Muhl, supra note 140, at 8 exhibit 3.
Id. at 6 exhibit 1.
20171
Factor Worker is an employee if- Worker is an independent
contractor if-
Integration Worker provides services Worker provides services
that are a part of the outside the regular business
employer's regular business of the employer
Investment in Worker has no investment Worker has a substantial
Facilities in the work facilities and investment in the work
equipment facilities and equipment
Right to Management retains a Management has no right to
Control certain type and degree of control the work process of
control over the work the worker
Risk Worker does not have the Worker has the opportunity
opportunity to make a profit to make a profit or incur a
or incur a loss loss from the job
Skill Work does not require any Work requires a special
special or unique skills or skill, judgment, or initiative
judgment
Continuing Worker has a permanent or Work relationship is for one
Relationship extended relationship with project or a limited duration
the business
This test cures the problems of the common-law test, which was
designed for a very different purpose. It allows dependent contractors to come
within the protective ambit of labor and employment laws by asking courts and
other reviewing tribunals to examine the actual relationship between the
employer and employee, for the purpose of determining whether there is an
imbalance of power between the two.
3. The Hybrid Test Examines the Totality of the Circumstances
Under the Hybrid Test, which is used primarily to determine whether a
person is an employee for purposes of Title VII and other discrimination statutes,
the "[e]mployment relationship is evaluated under both common-law and
economic reality test factors, with a focus on who has the right to control the
means and manner of a worker's performance."
'1 63
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B. The Strange Case of the NLRA Definition of Employee
The NLRA, which was front and center in the Northwestern labor
dispute, has an odd relationship with these tests. Because, as explained below,
the NLRA defines employees as all employees unless otherwise exempted,1 64
and because reviewing courts generally defer to the NLRB on matters that
Congress entrusted to the NLRB's administrative expertise,165 the courts have
historically given the Board a long leash when interpreting the NLRA, including
when it construes the statutory definition of employee.1 66
There are some unique limitations on the Board's otherwise expansive
authority to construe the statutory term employee. First, there are statutory limits.
For example, as explained more fully below, the definition's structure in itself
compels a two-part construction with a broad affirmative definition constrained
by several exemptions, which this Paper calls the negative definition. While the
Board has power broadly to construe the affirmative definition, it is without
power to read into the NLRA a new exemption167 or read out of the NLRA one
of the exemptions. 168 Second and relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that the
Board must use the common-law definition of independent contractor when
construing that term.169 Because the common-law definition of independent
contractor is inextricably interwoven with the common-law definition of
employee, the common-law definition is ever lurking in the Board's analysis of
the gateway jurisdictional question, who is an employee. This shadow definition
of employee creates an odd tension between the administrative law principle that
reviewing courts must defer to the NLRB's reasonable and permissible
construction of the NLRA, and the Court's command that the Board must use the
164 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
165 See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
166 See, e.g., Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385-86 (1975) (defining managerial
exemption on remand from Supreme Court case, NLRB v. BellAerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974),
directing the Board to clarify the definition of this exemption, on which the NLRA is silent); Ford
Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) (holding that confidential workers are not statutory
employees and defining confidential workers as those who "assist and act in a confidential capacity
to persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations," thereby creating the
labor-nexus test). The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the Board's labor-nexus test. See NLRB
v. Hendricks Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 189-92 (1981) (holding that
confidential employees who have access to confidential personnel information are exempted from
NLRA coverage).
167 See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1994) (rejecting the Board's
attempt to read certain nurse supervisors out of the NLRA by construing "in the interest of the
employer" prong of the supervisory exemption too narrowly).
168 See id.
169 See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
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common-law definition of independent contractor as its starting point for
determining whether a worker fits into that exemption.
170
In concrete terms, the Board, with court approval, has recognized the
broad, albeit circular, definition of the term employee, statutorily defined as "any
employee" regardless for whom they worked and even if they were on strike:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not
be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the
[Act] explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular
and substantially equivalent employment[.]1
7 1
In a previous article, I explained that this part of the definition of
employee could be written as follows:
EE = [any EE + (EEs of particular ER) + strikers]
172
But we can further simplify this equation. In the context of a labor
dispute between management and its unionized engineers who distributed pro-
labor literature asking their colleagues not only to support the union but also to
oppose a state constitutional amendment incorporating right-to-work principles
and to petition their congressional representatives to vote in favor of the federal
minimum wage law, the Supreme Court in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB
173 reaffirmed
that the NLRA protects workers A, who advance the interests of workers B, so
long as A are statutory employees.174 The Court held that this was so even if, as
here, the interests advanced, minimum wage law, had no effect on A, as was the
case here, where A were engineers who earned far in excess of the minimum
wage.175 Accordingly, to simplify this equation, I substitute WC (meaning
working class) for (EEs of particular ER). The equation now reads:
EE = [any EE + WC + strikers]
170 Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 with United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256.
171 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012); see Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984)
(accepting the Board's construction of the statutory definition of employee and describing it as
"striking[ly]" broad); see also At. Greyhound Corp., 7 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1196 (1938) ("The statutory
definition is of wide comprehension."); Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1274 (1938) (stating
that the statutory definition of employee has a "wide scope").
172 See The Vanishing Employee, supra note 129, at 501-03.
173 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
174 Id. at 564-65, 574.
175 Id. at 556.
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From the very beginning, the Board with court approval upheld a broad
variety of workers as falling within this broad statutory definition.1 76 Indeed, the
only workers who were not protected were those who specifically fell within one
of the NLRA's exemptions: agricultural workers, domestic services, family
members who work for their parent or spouse, government workers (who are, in
theory, protected under the Federal Labor-Management Relations Statute or
corresponding state law), and those who were already protected under the
Railway Labor Act. With the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, those exempted
from the NLRA also included supervisors and independent contracts. The full
definition of employee is therefore:
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer, unless [the Act] explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute
or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family orperson at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or
any individual having the status of an independent contractor,
or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45
U.S.C. § 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or by any
other person who is not an employer as herein defined. 177
With those exemptions, the statutory definition thus has two components, a
positive and negative component, which can be written as follows:
EE = [any EE + WC + strikers] -
[AW + DS + FAM + IC + Sup + RLA+ Gov]
Significantly, no exemptions apply to the case of the Northwestern
football players. We are, therefore, only dealing with the affirmative definition
of the term.
176 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 430 (1947) (deputized plant
guards); NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 404-12 (1947) (private plant guards, who are
required to be civilian auxiliaries to the U.S. Army's military police); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191-92 (1941) (job applicants); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (unfair labor practice and economic strikers).
177 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
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C. Northwestern's Football Players Are Statutory Employees Under the
NLRA
The Board's Regional Director was the first to examine the
Northwestern case, applying the common-law servant definition as the
appropriate legal standard, under which an employee is (1) "a person who
performs services for [an employer] under a contract [to] hire" for those services,
(2) subject to the employer's "control or right of control," and (3) "in return for
payment.' 178 Here, the football players readily satisfy all three conditions. First,
the players perform valuable services for Northwestern, an undisputed employer
under the NLRA. Those services generated $235 million between 2003 and 2012,
primarily from TV contracts, merchandise sales, and licensing 
agreements.179
Second, reviewing condition three, the players received compensation for their
services in the form of scholarships. The real question here is not whether the
players received compensation; indeed, some did not.
180 The question is whether
the players performed a valuable service that is amenable to compensation;
otherwise, those placed in involuntary servitude would technically not meet the
definition of employee, leading to the absurd result that such servants are not
workers entitled to labor law's protections.
The final question, noted as factor (2) above, is whether the players are
subject to the employer's (or its agents') control. Here, there can be no doubt that
they are. The players must follow their coaches' daily itineraries from 5:45 AM
to 10:30 PM.1" 1 They spend 50 to 60 hours per week on football-related
activities.182 Their coaches' control location, duration, and manner in which the
players execute their football duties.1
83 Moreover, Northwestern routinely
violated NCAA regulations limiting countable athletically related activities
hours during the season to 20 hours per week, and 4 hours 
per day.'84
The NCAA, which may very well be a joint employer because of its
heavy-handed regulation of the sport, objected to these findings, making four
178 Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 2015 WL 4882656, at *19 (Aug. 17, 2015). As
explained above, the common-law servant test is the flip side of the common-law independent est.
Accordingly, instead of using the Restatement's multi-factored test for determining whether the
university had insufficient control over the players such that the players were really independent
contractors, the Regional Director reviewed whether the employer had sufficient control over the
players to determine whether those players were servants. Given that the football players meet this
test, they would easily meet the economic-realities test, as the students were completely dependent
on the university to meet their basic needs. See id. at * 13.
179 Id.
180 See id. at * 14. The Board only considered whether scholarship players were employees, and
therefore the case technically does not present his question.
181 Id. at *20.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at *15-17.
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primary arguments, only one of which is legal. First, the NCAA claims that
Congress did not intend for scholar-athletes to be statutory employees.'85 This
argument is a red herring for a number of reasons. College football in the 1930s
was very different from what it is today.186 Although it was already well on its
way to being a commercialized enterprise, student-athletes till maintained much
of their student status up until the 1950s. Relatedly, the NCAA argued that the
scholar-athletes should not be treated as employees for purposes of the NLRA
because they are not treated as employees for purposes of any other statute.'87
This argument, at best, suggests that the tribunal consider whether there is a
common policy or legal thread running through these various statutes for why
student-athletes hould not be treated as employees. At worst, it suggests that the
student-athletes are potentially being exploited in many additional ways, such as
minimum wage and maximum hour violations.
Second, the NCAA argued that scholarship is financial aid, not
remuneration for services rendered.188 As explained above, that argument is
irrelevant because the question is not whether the athletes are compensated but
whether they can or should be compensated. This distills to the question whether
the athletes are performing valuable services for the employer.
Third, the NCAA argued that the NLRB Regional Director, who drafted
the Decision and Direction of Election in Northwestern, applied the wrong
test.l89 In its view, the common-law right to control test is not the correct test for
determining employee status under the NLRA. 190 Instead, the correct test is the
narrower test: whether the students' relationship with the university is "primarily
an educational one, rather than an economic one. '1 91
There are many responses to this argument. Chief among them is that
under any standard test-common law, economic realities, hybrid-these
football players are employees, leaving the policy question, whether the Board
should exercise its jurisdiction over these workers, the only question open for the
Board to decide. Putting the policy argument aside for the moment, the primary-
nature-of-the-relationship test does present a much closer call for which there
are, once again, two responses. First, under the facts of this case (and likely the
185 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. in Support of Northwestern
Univ. at 5-10, Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (No. 13-RC-121359), 2015 WL
4882656 (Aug. 17, 2015).
186 See generally George Will, Commercialization Rampant in College Football, NEWSMAX
(Jan. 7, 2010, 10:52 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/GeorgeWill!GeorgeWill-NCAA-football.
ESPN/2010/01/07/id/345662/.
187 See Brief of Anicus Curiae Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. in Support of Northwestern
Univ., supra note 185, at 5-10.
188 See id. at 12-14.
189 See id. at 10-12.
190 Id.
191 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489 (2004).
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facts of most Division IA teams) the football players satisfy the primary-nature-
of-the-relationship test, because these players spend most of their time playing
football, thereby earning hundreds of millions of dollars for their 
employers.92
In all fairness, however, given the devastating ways in which the Board has
utilized this test, it is not clear whether even a liberal Board would make such a
finding. 93 Second, and more importantly, the Board should abandon this test
because it fails to give effect to the purposes of the NLRA, which is to encourage
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining for a broad set of workers.1
94
A third response to this argument is worth pressing the pause button. Is
the primary-relationship test just another way of stating the economic-realities
test? And if so, is the Board legally constrained from using that test in
determining employee status, just as it is not permitted to use that test for
determining independent-contractor status? This is the conundrum posed by the
curious administrative rules that govern the NLRA's interpretation. Although the
Board has primary responsibility for construing the NLRA and the definition of
employee, in particular, and although the Board's permissible construction of
that term is entitled to deference, the Board is not permitted to construe the
statutory term "independent contractor" in any manner that is inconsistent with
the common-law test. The Board's only constraint in construing the term
employee is that its findings be consistent with the NLRA's broad language. To
the extent that the primary relationship test narrows the NLRA's broad language
it is inconsistent with the statutory language, and reviewing courts should strike
that construction as contrary to the Act's plain language.
This leaves one last argument, which permeates the NCAA's brief.'
95
Student-athletes do not comport with a common-sense understanding of what
constitutes an employee.96 This argument deserves special attention, covered in
the following section, as it raises important concerns about how best to protect
children and young adults.
192 See supra note 178-79 and accompanying text.
193 See, e.g., Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 225 (2007) (finding that salts, paid union
organizers, are not statutory employees where they do not intend to accept ajob if offered); Brevard
Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982-84 (2004) (finding mentally challenged workers
as not statutory employees because their work relationship was primarily rehabilitative rather than
economic in nature and citing earlier cases for the same proposition); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B.
at 492 (finding that graduate teaching or research assistants are not statutory employees because
those teachers and researchers are primarily students).
194 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); see also National Labor Relations Act, NLRB,
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
195 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. in Support of
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VI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH TREATING COLLEGE
ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES FOR PURPOSES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
It is difficult to find a definition of student-athlete in the literature. One
definition that seems to fit most instances is the following:
The term "student athlete" means an individual who engages in,
is eligible to engage in, or may be eligible in the future to engage
in, any intercollegiate sport. An individual who is permanently
ineligible to participate in a particular intercollegiate sport is not
a student athlete for purposes of that sport.197
A student-athlete then is a status--one who is eligible to play
intercollegiate sport either now or in the future as a student-athlete. Accordingly,
NCAA and college regulations focus heavily on eligibility. These eligibility rules
give a good idea of what constitutes a student-athlete for purposes of the law.
As explained above, the NCAA did make one intriguing argument: The
common-sense image of scholar-athletes is that they are not employees.198 This
statement may be true, but not for the reasons that the NCAA or the various
Division I football universities may advance. These parties advance the myth that
these athletes are students first, athletes second, and that they are amateur rather
than professional athletes. We willingly suspend our disbelief and mindlessly
adhere to the mythical ideal of the student-athlete as someone who is equally
parts student and athlete, no more, no less. But as the definition above suggests,
a student-athlete is merely one who is eligible to play sport.'99 There is nothing
in this definition about the importance of education.200 As one review observed:
This characterization-that athletes at NCAA-member schools
are student-athletes-is essential to the NCAA because it
obscures the legal reality that some of these athletes, in fact, are
also employees. By creating and fostering the myth that football
and men's basketball players at Division I universities are
something other than employees, the NCAA and its member
institutions obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain and related
benefits of the athletes' talents, time, and energy-that is, their
labor-while severely curtailing the costs associated with such
labor. The advantages to these institutions from fixing and
197 15 U.S.C. § 7801(9) (2012).
198 See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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suppressing labor costs in this manner have enabled them to reap
a fantastic surfeit of riches.0 1
Whether these players are students, athletes, or student-athletes, and
whether they are amateurs or professional employees, their universities, either as
employers or fiduciaries, have certain duties to provide them with: sufficient
food to sustain their enormous bodies, a healthy and safe environment, courses
and time to study, and leisure time sufficient for their mental health needs. Power
Five Football has shown itself as often disregarding these duties. These students,
as the Northwestern case demonstrates, were often hungry, had tightly
constrained schedules, and spent most of their time with their teammates rather
than forging other friendships that are so vital for young-adult mental health.22
There is also the problem that at least some coaches-as the Frostburg State case
indicates-are ignoring the fact that their players are sustaining multiple
concussions, often immediately life-threatening, and if not imminently life-
threatening, then potentially life-shortening.20 3 Finally, there is the problem of
financial exploitation, not only in the form of ticket sales and television revenue,
but in the form of inappropriate image appropriation.20 4
These circumstances suggest that the sport should be regulated at both
the youth and college levels. To be sure, the sport is already highly regulated,
mostly by the NCAA. But the NCAA is part of the structural exploitation of these
players. Therefore, to eliminate or at least lessen exploitation, regulation must
come from outside the system in the form of legal regulation. Rather than
permitting classic collective bargaining, which would rely on market pressures
to fix these problems, the government should regulate the sport in the following
ways. First, it could make student-athletes eligible for workers' compensation
and thus fix one of the problems-college athletic injury rates-with the solution
that started it all:
Today, much of the NCAA's moral authority-indeed, much of
the justification for its existence-is vested in its claim to protect
what it calls the student-athlete. The term is meant to conjure the
nobility of amateurism and the precedence of scholarship over
athletic endeavor. But the origins of "student-athlete" lie not in
a disinterested ideal but in a sophistic formulation designed, as
the sports economist Andrew Zimbalist has written, to help the
NCAA in its "fight against workers' compensation insurance
201 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The
College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REv. 71, 74 (2006).
202 See Friendships: Enrich Your Life and Improve Your Health, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/adult-health/in-depth/friendships/art-200
4 4860 (last
visited Mar. 22, 2017).
203 See supra Part IV.
204 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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claims for injured football players."
"We crafted the term student-athlete," Walter Byers himself
wrote, "and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and
interpretations." The term came into play in the 1950s, when the
widow of Ray Dennison, who had died from a head injury
received while playing football in Colorado for the Fort Lewis
A&M Aggies, filed for workers'-compensation death benefits.
Did his football scholarship make the fatal collision a "work-
related" accident? Was he a school employee, like his peers who
worked part-time as teaching assistants and bookstore cashiers?
Or was he a fluke victim of extracurricular pursuits? Given the
hundreds of incapacitating injuries to college athletes each year,
the answers to these questions had enormous consequences.
Critically, the NCAA position was determined only by its
member institutions-the colleges and universities, plus their
athletic conferences-as students themselves have never
possessed NCAA representation or a vote. Practical interest
turned the NCAA vigorously against Dennison, and the
Supreme Court of Colorado ultimately agreed with the school's
contention that he was not eligible for benefits, since the college
was "not in the football business.2 °5
Workers' compensation should be coupled with a robust health
insurance scheme that covers typical sport injuries, such as concussions, as well
as dietary education. An independent committee should be put together to study
and report the question whether these athletes might also be covered for certain
illnesses post-college career. This would be akin to covering retiree benefits. This
coverage should extent for the duration of the student-athlete's status as an
enrolled student, given the long-term health issues that often accompany sport
injuries.
Second, players should be compensated for all image appropriation used
in video games and in other instances. As this is already occurring, I only touch
upon it for completeness' sake.206
Third, there must be a culture change. We must accept that if we are
going to keep a student-athlete model for all or some of these students, then the
students must be treated 100% as students with all the obligations and
205 Taylor Branch, How the Myth of the NCAA "Student Athlete" Was Born, DEADSPIN (Feb.
2, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.deadspin.com/how-the-myth-of-the-ncaa-student-athlete-was-
born-1524282374 (quoting TAYLOR BRANCH, THE CARTEL: INSIDE THE RISE AND IMMINENT FALL
OF THE NCAA (Byliner 2011)).
206 Steve Berkowitz, Checks Are in the Mail for College, Pro Athletes in Video Games Suit,
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privileges/rights of students. That means the privilege of choosing their major
and their courses without interference from football coaches.
Fourth, significant thought must be given to whether a minor league for
football should be created. As discussed above, some of the most significant
problems with the college football system result from the monopsony power held
by the Power Five Conference member universities and the fact that there are no
alternatives for those who wish to play football.2°7
Finding a solution for the fifth issue, whether and how to revenue share,
is difficult and not readily discernible. Universities as businesses have an interest
in using revenue in a manner that they believe is not only in the best interest of
the university but also in a manner compatible with their business models.208 The
question here is what type of more equitable revenue sharing would make sense
for both parties.
This brings up the role for unions. Unions such as CAPA could be
elected by the students for several purposes. First, unions could also form a
bargaining committee to bargain, on behalf of players, with the university and
the NCAA in a tripartite structure that would set terms for college football. These
terms could be set for a fixed interval, say three to five years. The agreement
would take the form of an industry-wide master agreement for all college football
players. An industry-wide master agreement would alleviate the problem of
competition, discussed above. Relatedly, the tripartite structure could review
revenue sharing. Some of this sharing could, of course, include scholarships for
all who play football. But it could also include provisions for sufficient food for
all players to keep them healthy, and solutions regarding other typical bargaining
subjects, rather than those issues being set unilaterally by each team. Second and
relatedly, the students could be permitted to form a safety committee in which
they would receive union representation. There are many models for this type of
committee, coal mine safety committees being one such model.
VII. CONCLUSION
The main two goals for this Paper have been, first, to unravel, to some
extent, the socio-legal structural issues that facilitate exploitation of our youth
and college football players; and second, to present some possible remedies for
those problems. With respect to unraveling some socio-legal structure problems
with college football, I present two observations and one legal argument.
Initially, I describe some of the structural problems of youth and college football,
which include (1) tolerance for violence on and off the field; and (2) movement
away from amateurism and toward increased commercialization with (3) no
significant payoff for more than 99% of young athletes who play high school and
college football. This situation is exacerbated by the perpetuation of the student-
207 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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athlete myth, the monopsony power held by Power Five universities, and a
refusal by lawmakers to respond to these inequities and market failures with
regulations. This Paper next reviews two recent news accounts that vividly tell
this story of brutality and commercialization: (1) the case of Derek Sheely, a
fullback for Frostburg State's football team, who collapsed from a concussion he
received during Oklahoma drills, which resulted in Derek's death; and (2) the
case of Northwestern football players organizing so that they could have input
into the sport that dominates their college lives. It then argues that
Northwestern's football players (and, for that matter, many college football
players) are employees under the NLRA and indeed under any of the three legal
definitions of employee that permeate United States law. The Paper shows,
however, that this answer does not sit well with most of us because we do not
believe that student-athletes either are or should be paid professional employees.
The Paper's main point is that the NCAA and its member universities
should not be permitted to have it both ways. They should not be permitted to
treat their football players as professional employees but then appeal to a
mythical ideal of the student-athlete to convince us that these students are not
professional employees but merely amateur athletes who are primarily seeking
an education. This look-the-emperor-has-no-clothes moment exposes the deep
exploitation that these college athletes suffer not only at the hands of their
university employers and the NCAA but also at the hands of legal institutions
that remain blind to the truth about this exploitation. The Paper concludes with a
discussion of possible changes that could remedy this deep exploitation.
The commercialization and professionalization of college football has
been evolving for over a century.209 Given the promise of huge revenue streams,
at least for the universities that comprise the Power Five conferences, it is
unlikely that college football will revert to an amateur status any time soon.210
The ideal of the college athlete, like the unheard melodies of the Grecian
urn, is sweeter than the reality.211 The question for us is whether we can bring
209 See generally Will, supra note 186.
210 See generally Paula Lavigne, Rich Get Richer in College Sports as Poorer Schools Struggle
to Keep Up, ESPN (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espn/otI/story/_/id/17447429/power-5-
conference-schools-made-6-billion-last-year-gap-haves-nots-grows.
211 John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, POETRY FOUND.,
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems-and-poets/poems/detail/44477 (last visited Feb. 23,
2017):
Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear'd,
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone:
Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave
Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare;
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss,
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reality-student exploitation-closer to the ideal-student-athlete---or, like the
Grecian urn, is the ideal student-athlete destined to remain a mythical creature
always yearning for gratification yet never completely satiated. If only mythical,
then it becomes important to accept reality, and to break down collectively the
structures that permit these institutions to exploit young athletes.
Though winning near the goal yet, do not grieve;
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair!
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